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ARGUMENT 
I. REPLY TO THE STATE'S ARGUMENT CONCERNING MR. 
GALLUP'S COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE OF ALIBI 
STATUTE. 
The State appears to agree with Mr. Gallup's interpretation of the alibi 
statute which is that a a defendant in a criminal proceeding may always testify in 
his own behalf concerning alibi i.e. where he was at the time of the alleged crime, 
regardless of whether he has provided the State with advance written notice of his 
testimony. This is clearly an interpretation which the plain wording of the statute, 
rules, and case law, both in this state and other jurisdictions, supports. 
However, the State takes issue with an advance proffer of testimony 
provided to the trial court by Mr. Gallup's attorney. The State highlights the 
language of the statute which states that an alibi defense refers to any evidence that 
a defendant was at some "specific" place other than the scene of the crime, and 
then argues that since Mr. Gallup's attorney did not adequately proffer his client's 
testimony in advance to the effect that Mr. Gallup would testify that he was at 
some other specific place, and because - after the court instructed Mr. Gallup that 
he could not testify that he was at some other specific place - Mr. Gallup only 
testified that he was not the driver of the vehicle, that therefore no harm was done. 
The State argues that the issue is therefore moot and unripe because he never 
proposed in advance any testimony within reach of the alibi statute. In sum, the 
State argues that the court's ruling, even if erroneous, did not affect Mr. Gallup's 
testimony. 
In reply thereto, Mr. Gallup argues that his right to testify is a fundamental 
constitutional right guaranteed by the due process clauses of the Utah and federal 
constitutions, and that any infringement thereof should be treated with the strictest 
scrutiny. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 107 S. Ct. 2704, 97 L. Ed. 2d 37 
(1987). It is clear from the record that the trial court did interpret the alibi statute 
to restrict Mr. Gallup's testimony so that he could not testify that he was at a 
specific place other than the crime scene. The trial court communicated this 
instruction to Mr. Gallup and his attorney, and Mr. Gallup thereafter testified in 
conformity with the court's ruling. 
The State's argument that the error, if any, was harmless because Mr. 
Gallup's attorney did not make a proffer of Mr. Gallup's testimony falling within 
the ambit of the alibi statute, is misguided because it basically would require a 
defendant in every criminal proceeding to give the State and the trial court advance 
notice of his testimony whenever he wants to assert an alibi defense. Under the 
due process clauses of the Utah Constitution and United States Constitution every 
defendant has the right to remain silent up until the point he takes the witness 
stand, and this right extends to all pretrial proceedings. Mr. Gallup was not 
required to let the court and the State know in advance what his exact testimony 
would be, and the plain language of the alibi statute supports this conclusion. 
Further, Mr. Gallup's attorney did not proffer exactly what Mr. Gallup 
would testify to. He merely said, "I believe that his testimony is going to be that.. 
." and "I can't tell you exactly what his testimony will be, but I expect that his 
testimony will be that . . . ." (Emphasis added). Mr. Gallup's attorney was a 
public defender and no doubt was not as intricately aware of what his client's 
testimony would be until Mr. Gallup took the stand. Defendants are not even 
required to give advance notice of testimony to their own attorneys, and more often 
than not defendants testify differently to what counsel was expecting. Further, 
counsel should have been permitted to try and refresh Mr. Gallup's testimony 
while Mr. Gallup was on the stand. 
In sum, the court's ruling was error and plain error at that. Mr. Gallup 
testified in compliance with that ruling, and counsel never attempted to have Mr. 
Gallup try and remember where he was on the day in question because the court 
had ruled out the possibility of that line of questioning. Mr. Gallup's fundamental 
constitutional right to testify was infringed. His testimony cannot be restricted by 
counsel's pretrial proffer, especially when Mr. Gallup was not required to give 
anybody any advance notice of his testimony, including alibi testimony. 
II. REPLY TO THE STATE'S ARGUMENT CONCERNING MR. 
GALLUP'S PRE-ARREST RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT. 
The State argues that Mr. Gallup's act of hanging up the phone on the 
investigating police officer did not constitute an invocation of his right to remain 
silent because it was not done expressly and unambiguously, the situation did not 
give right to a prearrest right to remain silent, Mr. Gallup took the stand and 
thereby subjected himself to cross examination, and/or even if it did the error was 
harmless beyond reasonable doubt because other evidence of guilt was 
overwhelming. 
The cases which provide that invocation of the right to silence must be 
express and unambiguous are mostly cases where the defendant is in a custodial 
situation and therefore implicate the post-arrest right to remain silent. In these 
cases law enforcement is required to read Miranda rights to the defendant which 
includes the right to remain silent. It therefore makes sense that, after having been 
read that right, a defendant with knowledge of that right expressly and 
unambiguously invokes it. However, in the prearrest situation no such rights have 
been read, and therefore defendants may not know that they have the right to 
remain silent. They may just feel like not responding to an officer's questions 
because they sense that their answers may incriminate them. Because the courts 
have held that a prearrest right to remain silent exists, and because no Miranda 
rights are read, then defendants 
A 
should be able to assert their right to remain silent using their conduct, not just 
words e.g. hanging up a phone. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons this court should reverse Mr. Gallup's convictions. 
DATED this «? day of _ ^ ^ = _ _ 9 2011. 
Anthony V. Rippa/Brook J. Sessions 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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whatever, I'm -- the State is concerned, certainly, if he's 
testifying that the State has not received any notice of alibi, 
if that's -- I think -- I don't know any other way to not go 
into that . 
THE COURT: Let's get a microphone there. Yeah. So 
your concern is that his testimony may --
MR. JOHNSON: I think, unless he asks him what time 
of day it is today or something, that, if he talks about the 
incident, it's going to necessarily implicate whether or not he 
was present in the vehicle; and if not, then he's talking about 
an alibi defense. That's news to the State as of January 5th at 
12:20. So I think under the rule 7 7-14-2, that we need to have 
that notice at least ten days before trial, so we can research 
and investigate what he may be claiming. 
THE COURT: It's a valid concern, Mr. Sessions. Is 
your client going to --- with regard to the incident, not the 
phone call, I assume, but with regard to the incident, is he 
going to testify with regard to anything that would be an 
alibi, indicating he wasn't in the car that night? Because 
if it goes that direction, I think the State's correct; it's 
an alibi. 
MR. SESSIONS: I think --
THE COURT: I guess the second question is, is he also 
intending to testify about the telephone call. Hypothetically, 
if that was al] he wanted to testify about, I think I would 
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probably end up ruling that that opened the door for testimony 
about everything, or questions from the State about everything. 
MR. SESSIONS: That's a --- goes along the lines of the 
conversation that I was having with him, because in regards to 
him, my client wanting to testify, it is to the issue of to the 
telephone, because he wants to explain why he would elect not 
to talk to trie officer on the telephone. 
I had a talk with him about limiting that in the 
scope, in which I would on direct. Then the question on cross 
examination of whether or not the Court was going to allow it 
or not, that may go to the point where the State is asking 
questions that would illicit an alibi of defense, meaning an 
alibi as to "Someone else was in the car," or "I wasn't in the 
car." 
THE COURT: Right. I think whether the State illicits 
the alibi defense or you do, I think the notice issue is still 
there. I think if he's going to testify in any way, shape or 
form with regard to an alibi, then -- I'm sorry, he doesn't 
have all of his code books out here -- but I think if he's 
going to testify as to an alibi, the notice is there. You've 
got the statute up, Mr. --
MR. JOHNSON: I do, Judge, under 77-14-2, the defendant 
-- under subsection (1) "The defendant, whether or not written 
demand has been made, who intends to offer evidence of an 
alibi, shall not less then ten days before trial or at such 
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time as the Court may allow, file and serve on the prosecuting 
attorney a notice in writing of his intention to claim alibi. 
The notice shall contain specific information as to the place 
where the defendant claims to have been at the alleged offense 
-- time of the alleged offense, and as particularly as it's 
known to the defendant or his attorney the names and addresses 
of the witnesses by whom he purposed to establish that alibi." 
Then it goes into what our duty is of the State to rebut that. 
Under subsection (3) "If a defendant or prosecuting 
attorney fails to comply with the requirements of the section, 
the Court may exclude evidence offered to establish or rebut 
alibi. However the defendant may always testify on his own 
behalf concerning alibi." 
Then under subsection (4), it says, vxThe Court may, 
for good cause shown, waive the requirements of the section." 
The State would argue there is no good cause. This has been 
going on for a while. 
THE COURT: Do you want me to get a copy of the code so 
you can look at the whole thing? 
MR. SESSIONS: We need to look at that, because it 
sounds to me like the defendant can always testify, according 
to that code section. Let me just be a little more clear, 
too, because I had not intended that my client would need to 
testify. If I had been successful on the objection to the 
foundation and the phone call evidence coming in, he would 
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have had no reason to testify, and he would not have been 
test ifying. 
T HE C 0URT: Uh-huh. 
MR. SESSIONS: But because I was overruled on that, 
and that evidence came in, it appears necessary that he does 
testify. I would like to limit it to the specific testimony 
related to the telephone call; but the Court has opined that 
its likely that that would open the door for all questions. I 
think we need to look at the code section. 
MR. JOHNSON: It's 77-14 --
THE COURT: Okay, could I have the red book back? Oh, 
77 is here. Oh, gosh, it's 1997. Judge Davis, why have you 
got that? 
MR. SESSIONS: Its 77-14-2? Great, then I'll put it in 
my book. 
THE COURT: Has it been amended anytime recently? 
MR. JOHNSON: In 1980. 
THE COURT: That's not recent. Okay, we're good. 
MR. JOHNSON: So N97 would be accurate. 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MR. JOHNSON: Surprisingly enough. 
THE COURT: Yeah, it's not in here. Let me go back to 
this one here. No, they skip past it in both of these. Would 
you go borrow Judge Davis' Volume 4. 
MR. SESSIONS: While she's getting that, your Honor, I 
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would supplement my argument that my client doesn't have a 
specific person who he's going to refer to and say, "I was 
with this per son on such and such a night, : which would be an 
alibi. In fact, I believe that his testimony is going to be 
that he is going to not recall exactly where he was on that 
n i g h t . 
These charges were brought in March from an event in 
October, and I can't tell you exactly what his testimony will 
be, but I expect that his testimony will be something along 
the lines of "I don't recall where I was that night. I wasn't 
in Utah County. I wasn't driving the vehicle;" but as to 
specifics of NVI was with so and so at this location at this 
time," that will not be his testimony. 
I think given how procedurally this has ended up 
before the Court at trial, the exception does apply, but the 
defendant may always testify as to an alibi. 
COURT CLERK: (Inaudible). 
THE COURT: Okay, that: will work. 
MR. JOHNSON: I guess, Judge, if he's — his proffer 
is, as it seems quite vague, I guess the State doesn't -- even 
if we had that information, that would not go to the purpose 
and heart and spirit of the statute. So the State would not 
object. 
Certainly if he gets up there and says, MI was at the 
Gallivan Center on that day," then that's where I think the 
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fundamental and fairness and surprise comes to the State. So 




















THE COURT: I note th - 1 - 11 - i 14-2 says that "The notice 
shall contain specific information as to the place where the 
defendant claims to Yiave been at the time of the alleged 
offense, and as particularly as is known to the defendant or 
his attorney the names and addresses of the witnesses by whom 
he purposes to establish an alibi." 
So if his testimony is, "I don't remember where I was 
that night," I think that doesn't constitute an alibi; but I 
think for him to say, XXI wasn't in my car that night, and I 
wasn't in Utah County that night," is by inference to say, "I 
wa s somewhere else." 
So I think for him. to be specific enough to say, "I 
wasn't there," so ergo, "I was somewhere else," I think that 
starts to go towards an alibi; but I think If he just wants to 
say, XXI don't remember where I was that night," I think that's 
probably safe. 
MR. JOHNSON: That's fine with the State. 
MR. SESSIONS: Your Honor, I think --
THE COURT: And doesn't need notice. 
MR. SESSIONS: -- if he were saying, "I wasn't there, 
but I was at this location, and sc and so witnessed me at that 
location," that's clearly an alibi. 
"OURT: Riant 
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MR. SESSIONS: But if he rust says, 'VI wasn't there. I 
think I was at this location, but nobody was there," that's an 
explanation but not an alibi, as I would understand alibi in 
the statute. 
THE COURT: Weil, but if he says, "I was at another 
location," and that notice had been given, they could go to 
that location and investigate. 
MR. SESSIONS: But if he says, NVI was at my home that 
night," how would they be able to go to that location --
MR. JOHNSON: Well, because --
MR. SESSIONS: -- and know he was there or not there on 
that night? 
MR. JOHNSON: Well, because the officers actually did, 
and he wasn't there. So -- but we did do that. So he can say 
that if he wants. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. SESSIONS: And we'll go to there. 
THE COURT: So as far as any testimony that places him 
definitely somewhere else, 1 think that constitutes at least a 
partial alibi; and notice should have been given to the State 
so that they could either check out that story or not, as the 
case may be. 
Now apparently there's testimony that the officer 
could give that hasn't been given, that they went to the home 
that niqht? 
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MR. JOHNSON: What it is, is it would be hearsay, 
because it was other officers who went. Again, part of this 
investigation was trying to find the number. Contacted other 
troopers who went to his Murray address that he had on his 
driver's license, and said, "Go to there, see if the car's 
there, see if the defendant's there." That was within --
OFFICER CLANTON: It was about the same time. We were 
at the office and called. 
MR. JOHNSON: So within an hour. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. JOHNSON: They knocked on the door, they looked in 
the garage. 
MR. SESSIONS: Two of them 'went, a Sergeant and another 
trooper. 
MR. JOHNSON: So we would want to bring them in, but — 
THE COURT: You haven't been given notice. 
MR. JOHNSON: Yeah, that's the --
MR. SESSION: But if we got to that point, your Honor, 
that was the address the DMV had. That was not my client's 
current address. He had moved from that residence. So of 
course he wouldn't have been at that residence. I mean, we 
are kind of getting down to a tangential line there. 
MR. JOHNSON: At some point when you say, "You know 
what, I have no idea 'where I was. It was a year and a half 
ago," but then you could say at the same time, "but I know 
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for sure I wasn't there. I wasn't in Utah County. I wasn't 
driving," it seems to speak out both sides of his mouth, and 
that's where --
THE COURT: I don't think you can have it both ways, 
Mr. Sessions. 
MR. SESSIONS: Pardon me? 
THE COURT: I think you can have it both ways. I think 
he either testifies he doesn't have a memory or he doesn't know 
where he was that night, or he doesn't testify as to where he 
was that night, because if he is going to say, "I was at a 
specific place that night,'7 then the State should have had 
notice and should have had an opportunity to do whatever 
investigation they wanted to do in order to try and either 
corroborate his story, or.to debunk his story; but I don't --
I don't think he can have it both ways. So that's his choice. 
MR. SESSIONS: Well, your Honor, I would argue that 
the defendant always does have the right to explain himself, 
because he is the defendant in a criminal case and has that 
right. That's an exception in the statute. 
I would also argue that simply not knowing where you 
are specifically doesn't mean that you can't exclude other 
places. He could say, "Well, I know I wasn't in Switzerland 
that night, because I've never been to Switzerland." He could 
say, "I know 1 wasn't in Utah County, because I had no reason 
to go to Utah County." N\I know I wasn't in Canada, but I don't 
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Know exactly where I was. I was somewhere else." 
I believe that he should be allowed to testify to 
that, because he should be allowed to answer the questions 
against him. I understand the alibi statute is in place so 
that the officers can do an appropriate investigation, but also 
the defendant doesn't have a burden of proof, and the defendant 
has the right to remain silent. The defendant doesn't have to 
help the officers in all of their investigation. 
I would argue that if he has a specific location and a 
specific person who that they could check out, that it would be 
reasonable for them to check out, then the statute requires him 
to divulge that information; but if he had general information 
that says, VXI don't know where I was, but I wasn't there," that 
is a reasonable testimony from, a defendant. 
THE COURT: No, that/s different from what I was saying. 
MR. SESSIONS: Okay. 
THE COURT: Okay, what I was saying is, sure, if he 
says -- well, I was working on the assumption that he was going 
to say he was specifically somewhere else. I guess if his 
testimony is, SN1 just know I wasn't on the freeway that night. 
I don't know where I was, but I wasn't on the freeway that 
night," I think that/s probably allowable. 
MR. SESSIONS: Okay. 
THE COURT: But if he starts to establish that he was 
someplace where they could have investigated, that becomes an 
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alibi , i n m y o p i n., o r, . 
MR. SESSIONS: Okay. 
THE COURT: I don't read the -- be quiet, Mr. Gallup. 
I don't, read the sentence "However, the defendant may always 
testify on his own behalf concerning alibi" as something that 
negates the previous two paragraphs. 1 think that just simply 
means if he wants to establish his own alibi and doesn't have 
other witnesses he may do so, but he still has to give notice. 
So in hi.s testimony today, if he wants to get up and 
say either XVI don't have a memory of where I was," or "I know 
I wasn't on the freeway that night; don't know where I was, 
but I wasn't on the freeway," I mean, if he just wants to do a 
blanket denial that he was speeding, I don't think the statute 
precludes him from doing that. 
I would strike any testimony that starts to establish 
a place where he was that night, as opposed to being on the 
freeway at the time the officer was chasing this particular 
vehicle that was registered to him. Otherwise, that approaches 
an alibi and notice has not been given, okay? So have we 
worked our way through that one? 
(Counsel conferring off the record) 
THE COURT: I'm ready to move on, folks. We've got a 
jury coming back in less then 50 minutes. Okay, as to the jury 
instructions, I am a little concerned, since identity is not --
identity is very important in this case, we don't have a long 
